Part III

Creations
Chapter 7

MODES OF CREATIVITY

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Introduction

Commenting on the current valuation of creativity, Carey Young has written: ‘business worth is increasingly evaluated on the proven capacity to innovate. If a business is unable to invent new products and services it will not be seen as competitive. Whatever the economic climate, the endeavour to think and act creatively now runs close to the core of capitalist enterprise’ (Young 2002: 7). In its turn, the (UK) Council for Science and Technology tells us that ‘successful economies depend increasingly on the creation, communication, understanding and use of ideas and images’ (2001: 1). As with business, so with culture.

People across the world express growing interest in protecting or transacting intellectual and cultural productions. It is clear that there is an assumption of creativity written into attempts to protect cultural property, as well as other kinds of intellectual property (IP). Yet amidst these developments, there is little specific anthropological understanding of the modes in which ‘creativity’ operates. Most discussions of the concept ‘creativity’ in anthropology are attempts to contest received notions and/or to define it in a way that has cross-cultural relevance (Ingold 1986; Liep et. al. 2001). I wish to suggest the possibility that there are different modes in which creativity operates, that creativity is specifically understood and instantiated in different places, and that these differences have consequences in terms of economy and social relations. Creativity is an explicit focus of Euro-American discourse in the realm of art and, increasingly, of business. Intellectual property attribution is apparently vital to both. But art and business do not distinguish modes. We could use either to ask how Euro-Americans
think that establishing the conditions for creativity will have an effect.

It might be argued that creativity, as an explicit description of action, is only of interest to Euro-Americans (see Liep 2001). However, with the spread of international intellectual property regimes, this can no longer be the case. Creativity is now a global value and as a Euro-American concept is already apparent in the way international institutions, and indeed anthropologists, approach places such as Papua New Guinea. One of PTC’s aims was to capitalise on work already done in Melanesia. Here, I utilise a perspective, understood through a particular case, which crystallises much of what we know from the literature to comment upon the unfamiliar terrain (for anthropologists) of IP and creativity.

I set out to demonstrate that a dominant Euro-American rhetoric points to a modelling of combinations based on appropriation. One could call it an ‘appropriative mode’ which has creativity as its adjunct. But the thrust of current discussion which implies that this is the only mode of creativity is simply not true. Counter-examples of creativity abound. Some hit Euro-Americans from elsewhere, some from practices with which many are familiar. What prevents Euro-Americans from seeing other forms is their division between persons and things. The procreation of persons is generally excluded from creating and appropriating things. This then gives us at least two modes from the outset.

It is my argument that one can find a mode of what we can rightly call creativity in Melanesia which at one and the same time contains familiar elements, and yet relies upon different premises. By uncovering these specificities, I look to highlight how the concept of intellectual property is embedded in a matrix of Euro-American thinking, in suppositions about being and doing, subjects and objects, agency and personhood. These are thrown into relief by comparison with Melanesia. Given that there has been little written in anthropology directly on creativity, the themes which I select to focus upon have to be of interest both in Melanesia and in Euro-America. The way I set out to delineate intellectual property is given by what I will say about the Melanesian material.

Comparing modes of creativity as modes of action demands a working definition of creativity. The aim at this point is to find a conceptualisation wide enough to move between contexts, comparing processes and the conceptual worlds they engender. My definition is a distillation of the main ways creativity has been recognised, specifically in anthropological writings, but also more generally (see Arieti 1976; Ingold 1986). For the purposes of this chapter, let us take creativity as consisting of three major elements. The first is combination – creativity can be recognised where combinations of things or ideas are apparent. The second is that this process of combination is directed by a will or intent. The third is novelty of form or outcome.

If we take this definition we can ‘see’ creativity on the part of Papua New Guineans. It sets up a comparative frame. But that leads the investigator into considering a set of ground rules and conditions which could
never have produced the ideas of property in creations, let alone intellectual property, found in Euro-American imaginings. I start with the third of my elements: innovation.

**Contemporary Creativity 1**

There has recently been a public reiteration in Britain that creativity lies in the ability to combine elements drawn from many sources. The UK government currently seeks secondary and higher education policies which encourage a diverse knowledge base explicitly to encourage innovation. Narrow specialisation is not the way forward, rather a wide range of subjects should be taught to each child right up to university level (UK Government./DfES 2002). Creativity can be contrived in the population by forcing combination upon it. Indeed, the development of science and technology is imagined to lie in combining the ‘imagination and understanding’ of the arts and humanities with the specific information bases of science. There is a more or less explicit motivation in all this: economic regeneration, growth in the national economy and ‘self-fulfilment’ for society’s members. Fostering the capacity for creativity in education will create the conditions under which business will flourish. In other words, creativity has an objectified instantiation which generates wealth. ‘In our ever changing world, one quality will be valued above all others: creativity. Our children, as no generation before, will need to think outside the norm, to be able to use their imagination and to innovate’ (Coxon 2001: 34).

British society itself may be judged on its success in fostering and recognising innovation. As the British minister for Culture, Media and Sport recently wrote: ‘The most successful economies and societies in the twenty-first century will be creative ones. Creativity will make the difference – to businesses seeking a competitive edge, to societies looking for new ways to tackle issues and improve the quality of life. This offers the UK enormous opportunities. We have a well-deserved reputation for creativity’ (Smith 2001).

There must also be mechanisms in place with which this innovation may be harnessed. The promise of intellectual property rights can be seen as both the motivation for acting creatively (a mechanism to encourage creative thinking by rewarding its application), and the instrument through which certain kinds of persons (those in competition with one another and needing a way of publicising their work, while protecting it) are mobilised (Barry 2000; Strathern 2002).

Education and business models alike (and they flow into one another) emphasise adaptability and flexibility as necessary attributes for working effectively in the modern world. In extolling the virtues of developing people’s capacities and rewarding their manifestation in innovative objects (property), a recursive logic is established. The process of complexification which ‘adaptation’ must be tailored to is generated within a culture itself technologically driven. The effect is a perception of the world speeded up.
The admonishment in the focus on creativity is that people need to speed up themselves. But the logic is almost narcissistic. The more creative people become, the more creative they have to become to keep pace with the apparent ‘runaway’ (Leach 1967; Beck 2001) character of the world outside them. Change and speed is projected outward as a (structural) condition (technical advance), and working to establish flexible and adaptable people (Martin 1997) as a response to this acceleration is in fact the engine of perceived change and acceleration. The fact that creativity is cited as the necessary tool amounts to a self-sustaining loop in the projection and reflection of conceptual categories. One might even call it an autopoietic mode of generating meaning, social relations and appropriate objects (Luhmann 2000: 2). The effect of people feeling they are ‘left behind’ by the world reconstitutes it as separate from individual efforts (and thereby available for appropriation).

In these constructions, human creativity is primarily intellectual creativity. It exists as abstract thought. How is the intellect produced as such? This is an interesting question when considering IP. An economy which constantly sees the need to innovate (or in earlier times improve) also has an investment in making people add their labour to create goods (add value), which, as Marx pointed out, was valued as abstract labour. Abstract labour is not the work of particular individuals (social labour) but effort which could be commuted into an impersonal general measure (labour time). The work of the mind is similarly constituted as abstract by the very conceptualisation of creativity as something into which anyone can tap. It is the work of instantiation which makes distinctions (property). The fact that creativity is thus contingent (neither logically necessary nor logically impossible) for any particular person can be managed by facilitating conditions, that is establishing the right situations in which creativity (a particular kind of intellectual work) can be first expressed, and then exploited. The reverse side is that without such effort on the parts of educationalists, business managers, state laws, and so forth, creativity would not appear. In this mode, creativity is contingent to the world. It is a capacity some people demonstrate at certain times. The rhetoric is directed to generalising the capacity. In this way, it has been turned into something like the labour potential of a workforce which needs to be tapped through human organisation. Labour of the mind is embodied in material outcomes. These can be owned.14

Contemporary Creativity 2

On precisely these themes of innovation and economy, I was struck recently by a contrast in the (lack of) claims people made to innovations in business practices, and the (constant, highly articulated) claims they made to innovations in religious and musical practice on the Rai Coast of Papua New Guinea.15 As someone there explained,

whatever you find through your own endeavour in the arena of the spirit cult belongs to all of us as a family. It is for us all to generate a name for
ourselves and consume pigs on the basis of this name. But whatever innovations you accomplish on the side of business, you cannot claim [the idea behind].

In those villages, people often try new ways of making money. One will construct an oven from an old oil drum and cook cakes for sale in the market; another develop a system of gambling for plates of cooked rice and meat. Yet such new ideas are not equivalent to a new spirit. People complain that whenever anyone comes up with a new idea for a business venture, everyone else follows suit, and soon the market is flooded with cakes, or with gambling for rice plates. They describe this as ‘an idiotic custom of ours’, to copy and repeat others’ ideas (tawa’narnung). The word is the same as is used for the defamation (inappropriate use, copying) of a spirit voice. Yet it does not bring the same penalties. When questioned about someone copying their business idea, people reply that everyone wants to make money, and it is open for anyone to try any way to do so. What is not ‘public’ (pablik) on the Rai Coast is the particular creativity which is understood to be part of a family and its interactions with its ancestors, spirits and lands. New ideas just do not figure centrally in this. It is a form of creativity based on combinations of people. Spirits/songs are seen as a resource – a powerful one, as they elicit the currency of kinship, the currency through which affinal (reproductive) relations are managed. Because of the kind of resource that this is, a resource commensurate with other means of reproduction – understood as the regeneration of people and places through the work of family groups – it is inappropriate for any one person to claim (as an individual idea), even though the new song originated in their mind. People achieve prominence and authority through these creations. They do not achieve exclusive control over them, however.

As the resources generated by this mode of action are multiply owned, those that appeal to the form of familial creativity in their business enterprises run the risk of invoking multiple claims to ownership. This point is clearly illustrated in the case of cocoa fermentary businesses that have been undertaken in the area. Opening a fermentary on the Rai Coast is a large undertaking in terms of labour. The two fermentaries which have been opened there to date have both relied on variations of residence group (kin) formations for the recruitment of that labour. And there is a rhetoric employed by the organisers of these businesses which deploys the notion of communal enterprise by an extended family group to recruit labour. Promises are made about access to the facilities in terms of the customary needs of the residence group. The form of words is usually: ‘we all face difficulties in finding enough wealth to fulfil our affinal obligations – for marriage, child and death payments. The fermentary is for everyone and will help with the kinds of difficulties we all face’.

Both fermentaries are the site of conflict and dispute, and thus experience difficulty in retaining labour. The history of one is illustrative. A succession of ‘managers’ (younger kin to the ‘owner’) have given up buying, drying and organising the transportation of cocoa because the original
owner of the fermentary, who is also one of the elders of the residential group in whose name it was established, has not distributed the profits. He has not paid much in the way of wages either. In addition, he has often complained that those resident in the village and managing the facility misuse (his) money. The complaint is based on his perception that as the investor of capital, and the elder of the people who work there, both custom (kastom) and business sense dictate that he should receive all the profit of the enterprise and then redistribute it as he sees fit. As there are constant tensions and multiple claims, he does not see fit to make such distributions, and instead channels the money to his own children’s school fees. One rationalisation I have heard of this use of the money is that they are the children of the residential group, and thus an investment in the future of the village as a whole. For nine or ten months of the year the fermentary remains unused – a kind of sad memorial to the complaints it has generated – standing in the village plaza.

This set of circumstances fairly describes not only fermentary businesses in the area, but also small stores, coffee-buying schemes, and also ‘Youth Group’ and ‘Mother’s Group’ activities. Always, it seems, there is someone who claims the enterprise is the result of their own strength and endeavour, ignores those who have provided labour and support, and consumes the capital of the business. I suggest here that expectations of multiple ownership, based on customary principles of shared interest in the products of people’s labour, conflict with a convenient reading of capitalism where having an innovative idea and making it a reality is enough to claim exclusive control. This reading places power and resources in the hands of the capitalist at the expense of others’ interests. ‘Convenient’, because at the same time, the entrepreneur appeals to customary authority and multiple interests, rather than wage-labour payments, to recruit their major resource (labour).

Rai Coast people are clearly able to understand different modes of action (innovation in business is not the same as innovation in reproductive endeavour), even if these modes get mixed up in practice. This means we must look to the conditions under which different kinds of imaginative action appear and have effect (become modes of action). While Reite people do not themselves talk about IP, it seems one can find a mode of creativity here which is at once of the kind appealed to in IP concepts (innovative and useful development), and different from it.

**Modes of Creativity**

The rhetoric of creativity in contemporary Euro-America is driven by commerce, and relies upon property. Intellectual Property law demonstrates this forcefully with the explicit suggestion that there would be no innovation or creative endeavour without the promise of private reward to motivate individuals. But there is no surprise to find an indigenous critique, as the construction I have outlined above is all about people’s
capacities. There are a number of places we could look for such critiques, and I do not see it as the task here to catalogue and discuss each of them. Here instead are some suggestive moments where Euro-Americans have made different models to that outlined in IP. For example, a close study of the poetry and artistic work of William Blake, or the political economy of Marx, reveals certain critiques. Recent feminist scholarship has been explicit in focusing on creativity as an ideological device (Delaney 1986). When Marx pointed out the appropriative nature of capitalist relations of production, he focused upon exactly that which is hidden within the dominant mode of production, yet upon which it necessarily relies: the reproduction of labour power. The ‘mind forged manacles’ and ‘dark satanic mills’ of Blake’s poems were a critique of constraint, objectification, and the hoarding of creative authority that detracted from people’s capacity to know creative power.16

In the epic poems which he wrote towards the end of his life, Blake returns to central moments from many angles. He seems to suggest that any one perception contains a miniature of the whole. These poems are hard to comprehend because chronology is fragmented, but this structure points to Blake’s concern (Fox 1976). Blake’s model of a ‘distributed’ creativity in persons and imagination (explicitly fashioned against an appropriative mode) is perhaps most clearly expressed in the poem Milton (Blake 1886). At the end of that poem, the reader and the poet are drawn into a single moment, a single image of Blake himself in his garden at Felpham, which contains within it the whole vast panorama of creation and eternity. The poem, fifty pages or so in length, is focused upon a single event which happens in an instant. This is the ‘moment in each day’ when ‘the poet’s work gets done’. That moment, like the moment of ‘an artery’s pulse’, is at once minute and vast, ‘as brief as inspiration and as long as all lifetime’ (Fox 1976: 153).

Seest thou the little winged fly, smaller than a grain of sand

It has a heart like thee; a brain open to heaven and hell,

(Milton: 20: 27–28)

The brain of the smallest of Nature’s creations is open to both heaven and hell, which for Blake meant to the creative oppositions of eternity, just as the poet’s brain, in the instant of inspiration, becomes open to this reality:

‘There is a moment in each day that Satan cannot find,
Nor can his Watch Fiends find it, but the industrious find
This moment and it multiply.’

(Milton: 35: 42–45)

In one moment then, the whole exists, and thus we are to understand that creativity is immanent in all moments, and distributed through creation. It is not the preserve or property of a particular institution or deity
(‘all that lives is holy’). In Blake, it is the forces of constraint, of authority, and of property, which blind Blake’s contemporaries, in his view, to a mode of action which is consistent with the mode of creativity that I call appropriative here:

For Blake, the essence of human life is not thought but experience, the imaginative apprehension of the unseen worlds which we believe will always exist for the joy of man’s discovery. These may as well be the worlds of thought, but for Blake the experience of discovering them rather than the intellectual possession of them is paradise, Eden… (McGann 1973: 18 emphasis added).

Alternate modes then exist for Euro-Americans and, as I will outline further, on the Rai Coast of Papua New Guinea. The rhetoric of commerce precipitates a modelling of combination in one mode. This rhetoric, however, relies upon the contingency of creativity in the world, locating it within the minds of individuals and constituting the material as the register of creative intervention. What are the other aspects of this mode of action?

**Anthropological Creativity**

In his famous discussion of the engineer and the bricoleur, Lévi-Strauss (1966) introduces a metaphor for two different types of creativity.17 Whereas for the engineer, problems can be solved through creating an abstract model or formula to solve the problem at hand, for the bricoleur, projects always involve the reuse of existing elements which were not specifically designed for any purpose but – in novel combinations – can be put to other purposes. The former begins with the abstract, the latter with the concrete. Both create structures but from (apparently) different starting points. The difference between the engineer and the bricoleur, Lévi-Strauss argues, can be applied more widely to the difference between scientific and mythic thought. While all human beings have a capacity for abstract thought, ‘primitive’ thought locates abstractions in existing symbols which relate to (but are not the same as) concrete units in the world (1966: 17–21).

Relying upon the distinction between signifier and signified to discuss the operation of the mind, Lévi-Strauss locates the creative process, be it bounded by past concrete reality in the case of ‘savage thought’/the bricoleur or open in the case of the scientist/engineer, at the level of the signifier. These images of different types of combination have gained great currency. However, I locate his fundamental premise of the separation of signifier from signified as an aspect of a particular mode of creativity. For Lévi-Strauss, what is significant about combination could not be properties of things themselves. All must be returned to the level of symbolisation. ‘[T]he prohibitions [in food taboos] result not from intrinsic properties of the species to which they apply but from the place they are given in one or more systems of significance …’ (1966: 99).
How is it that ‘the science of the concrete’ ended up outlining the play of signification (where the ‘signified’ is not the world of objects but what is created by the sign) as the prior and essential element in his two kinds of creative process? There is an ‘ethnographic’ observation here, which is to note the abstraction of the will, of agency and of purpose from physical matter. The mentalist approach makes these elements not only human attributes in relation to the natural, nonhuman and extant cultural world, but thus locates them outside that world (including the already created world of human society and culture), which the bricoleur utilises in his combinations, and which the engineer draws upon in thinking up new structures to realise in concrete form. The principle of stability and structure is prior to any particular (human) intervention.

The meaning of the adjective physical underwent a significant change in connotation with the new seventeenth-century conception of nature as matter. In terms of that conception the word physical i.e. ‘natural’ came to mean ‘material’, and since matter is ‘bodily’, physical also came to mean ‘bodily’ – but ‘body’ in a sense quite excluding ‘soul’. This meaning of physical stands in contrast to the antecedent scholastic Aristotelianism, in which physical was certainly ‘bodily’, but not to the exclusion of ‘soul’. (Leclerc 1990: 5)

The abstraction of the mental from material left nature, or even society, apparently without human purpose:

[T]he biological theory of evolution explains the origin of new species by invoking spontaneous mutations and with reference to selection in the struggle for survival. Novelty or creativity appear nowhere as independent concepts. This same reductive strategy is applied in order to explain the development from a fertilised seed to a fully grown living being. The procedure applied is analogous to the one employed to deduce the production of the physical properties of the macroscopic body... from the constitution of their respective elements. (Rapp 1990: 77).

What is it that, by its absence, makes biological evolution and human culture, mechanical, functional and self-sustaining (Franklin n.d. )? The short answer is agency. People have projects (are authors). The bricoleur and the engineer are both creative in the limited sense of generating combinations to fulfil purposes. For Lévi-Strauss agency is on the level of epistemology, not ontology (Viveiros de Castro 1998). The position he establishes, with human beings sifting and combining already existent symbolic elements (Lévi-Strauss 1961: 160), making sense at the level of signifier, has to assume human cultures as already created objects. That is, even when it is the abstracted mind which gives form to perception and thus experience, the human will acts at the level of reorganisation, not ex-nihilo creation. Human cultures are obviously created objects, they arise in social relations between persons. But they are not directed. The human mind in this view is the vehicle for the replication of cultures (Ingold 1986: 200). There is a similarity to views of biological evolution.
here, wherein individual organisms are the vehicles for the transmission of genes. Both nature and culture in this Euro-American construction are created objects, but not the product of human creativity because creativity requires intention or will in the authoring of combination (Lévi Strauss 1966: 64).19

Natural Creativity

In his discussion of the place of creativity in Darwinian models of evolution, Ingold notes that ‘[t]here are two facets to the meaning of creativity, as it is commonly understood. The first is the implication of subjective agency. To create is to cause to exist, to make or produce. The second … is that what is brought into being is novel. There is no creativity in the mechanical evolution and replication of a preformed project’ (Ingold 1986: 177). There is, then, a difference between what is produced as novel by an agent, and what is produced by random chance, by mutation under the constraints of natural selection. Ingold goes on: ‘it would seem that, so long as we insist that the implication of agency is essential to our conception of creativity, we would have to deny the operation of a creative principle in Darwinian evolution’ (1986: 178). In other words, discovery is not creativity (Hastrup 2001: 31, 32), and revelation of form is not the generation of form.20

There is a consistent distinction made in the literature Ingold reports upon. This lies in the difference between what people do and what they undergo (1986: 209). This relates to IP. While one might attribute a kind of creativity to the ongoing development of species in evolution, or indeed to the constant negotiation of novel situations by human subjects, neither are recognisable in IP law because of the distinction enshrined there between intentional creativity and plan-less generation. As intention resides in the human mind alone, creativity is given a particular meaning. The outcomes of creative action are explicitly objects or practices which bear the imprint of planning (novelty, inventive step, utility). These in turn become properties of the object, while creativity remains with the person.

The compact Oxford English Dictionary gives a definition of creativity which highlights another two, related types in which Euro-Americans imagine it. These are ‘the action or process of creating; the action of bringing into existence by a divine power or its equivalent’, and ‘an original production of human intelligence or power especially of imagination or imaginative art’. They are qualitatively different. Yet the overlap between them is also significant. And both distinction and overlap have analogies within the current rhetoric of human creativity. The intellect is seen as separate, in much the same way as the deity (see Mimica 1991: 50–51). Novelty and agency combine in a validating concept – creativity – which in its own conceptual combination invokes the first instance of creativity, the exercise of divine power. The promise is an ability to change the
conditions of being. The fact that so much weight is put upon the abstracted and transcendent intellect in Euro-American formulations, both in the recognition of original expression (copyright), and invented objects (patents), and in the ontological issue of ex nihilo origination, alerts us to the fundamental disjuncture between differentiated intelligence and material realisation. The control that humans exercise over nature comes about through their intellect, and it is the projection of that intellect into objects, which then in turn reflect back the workings of intelligence and thus foster identification. A Lockean understanding of labour is extended to the intellect, and thus the objects which demonstrate the imprint of the intellect can be regarded as property. Something has been appropriated from the common heritage of humanity.

At the same time as being valorised as the solution to everything from the decline in manufacturing industry to personal anomie, creativity also carries dangers for Euro-Americans. While there is a ‘natural’ right to appropriate, there is a moral imperative not to appropriate too much. When considering creativity, that ‘too much’ starts to look like power itself. This is another aspect of understanding appropriative creativity. A leading economist (Rifkin), writing recently on the subject of human cloning in a national newspaper, outlined a critique of human creativity with a long history. He is explicit about the correct, transcendent, position of a being who can change the destiny of the human race (as cloning could do): we ‘play God with our evolutionary destiny’ and thus ‘endanger the future of civilisation’ (Rifkin 2001) by interfering with evolution. Human control over the natural world, through the abstract activities of the intellect, carries real dangers. There is an admonition in the language used, familiar to us all, that creativity is also potentially destructive. Usurping the deity and allowing ‘each person [to] become their own private god’ (ibid.) shows the extent, and the limits, of current Euro-American belief in the creative power of the mind and its works. Human knowledge is limited and flawed, but powerful. In fact, the psychological approach to creativity would confirm these observations. ‘Creativity, a prerogative of man, can be seen as the humble human counterpart to God’s creation … human creativity uses what is already existing and available and changes it in unpredictable ways’ (Arieti 1976: 4). My point here is that this idea of creativity as a transcendent force accords with a notion of the intellect as separate and organising. With the removal of God, the notion of transcendence is replaced by notions of contingency.

Directed novelty and creativity are perceived as extra to physical processes. As creativity is separated from the process of becoming, it is valued and validated as an contingent extra to the mechanistic (that is undirected) recombination of elements, in novel forms, through the dual interplay of chance and necessity (Ingold 1986). Not all combination then demonstrates creativity. The difference that will or agency makes is that there is a conscious organisation of elements in the mind which is then realised in the world. Thus the correct conditions for recognising personhood among Euro-Americans – control over the object world by
the thinking subject – are fulfilled. The operation of will connects abstract mental elements to the world in particular projects which are then thought of as creative. The world goes on itself, independent of the will which created such interventions. The natural world, scientifically understood, is full of structures (chemical, physical) already given, quite aside from the question of materiality. In the social world, the Euro-American understanding of creativity as remaining with the person puts an inflection on creativity as a continuing active or reproductive force. What is being reproduced is the Euro-American self, and it is the materiality of the object (its lack of creativity) which effectively enables the reproduction of the self in relation to the material, at every turn. This holds as much for intellectual property (realised in objects) as any other form of property.

Strathern (1992) has pointed out that our notions of culture, and of change, rely on the perception of new and unique combinations coming deliberately into being. Thus culture change and creative moments are often seen as synonymous. The notions of creolisation (Hannertz 1987) and of the disruptive yet creative potential of cultures meeting have been well rehearsed in anthropology (and see Löfgren 2001). If new cultural forms are made up of unique combinations, so too are people. That internal qualities of the mind allow control over the external environment defines personhood as exactly the ability to contain both abstract thought and the will to harness objects to its intentions. This combination is a condition for making new combinations. The psychologist with an interest in creativity and the educationalist who promotes the development of the child both encourage us to understand, and therefore have in place, the conditions under which one may think creatively (Arieti 1976; Coxon 2001).

To distil, I am pointing to six interlinked elements that contribute to an appropriative mode of creativity. Firstly, that Euro-Americans are interested in the intellect itself as a site of powerful combination. Secondly, that the outputs of the intellect must appear in physical form if they are to be realised. Thirdly, that such interventions have potential for novelty against a background of perceived stability. There is no agency or will embedded in the physical, including the structures of human society. There may be evidence of past creative input, but; fourthly, once realised in an object, creativity can no longer be in that object because will or agency are seen to lie in the subject. The imprint of form from the intellect is a stamp, it does not transfer will or organisational capacity to objects. And fifthly, that this makes creativity an occasional, human intervention. It is contingent to ‘the world’ which is already structured; as a mode of action, it can be encouraged or suppressed. Finally, the transcendence of the abstracted intellect/will combination finds resonances with a Euro-American tendency to locate reason or knowledge in the individual mind, and thus reproduces the self through its operation.
Rai Coast Combinations

I now move on to outline a modelling of combination in Melanesia which is differently structured. Whether attempting business projects, or attending to kin, Reite people are interested in the ways in which persons combine, or differentiate themselves. This produces a mode of action which is not founded upon appropriation. Individual will is an element, novelty appears, but the logic of the mode of creativity puts emphasis elsewhere.

Nekgini speakers live in small hamlets that are based around a meeting house and a cult house. People become related to one another there by co-residence in these hamlets. The residential group is named the palem, and this word refers to a platform on which ceremonial payments to affines are piled. The cult house contains the paraphernalia of different spirits (kaapu) which are called upon exclusively by men. Kaapu are musical, known by their ‘voices’, which are the melodies of sacred songs. They reside in specific places in the landscape, and are called to the hamlet for specific purposes: life cycle changes, exchanges and ceremonial performances. Each spirit is owned by particular palem members. They are transmitted through inheritance of a palem identity, and also transacted between palem. In transaction, they become wealth items.

Palem are the focus of a generative system. Persons become related to one another through living together in a palem. All second-generation residents of a palem are siblings. Paleo are combinations of people which, through the work involved in growing the next generation, become a single entity. Paleo are recognised as whole units (palem konaki) at the point where they collectively produce a payment to another residential group. These payments are made for women who arrive in marriage, and for their children. The payments take the form of an effigy, made up of garden produce, wealth items and a live pig. These items are explicitly named as body parts. The kaapu animate this body, giving it voice and calling for the recipients. Paleo are named after the site of their cult and meeting house, and the effigy is ‘at their door’, born from their collective work. Places as combinations of people and spirits come to have identity through the recognition they gain in dramatising their existence through exchange. Each payment made as a palem constitutes the work of the palem as the work of producing its children, and acknowledging the unique combination which has gone to make it up.

Palem children then are also combinations: of the labour, nurture, knowledge and spirits of a particular place. Such children are siblings because they embody elements from the same place. They are differentiated from one another, just as palem themselves are, through the relationships they have external to the palem. It is in these relationships that the particularity of the person/palem emerges because of its unique position (name) and unique set of constitutive relations to other places, affines or maternal kinsmen. As a system which generates new palem, new named social groups, new spirits and designs to accompany them,
and new persons as the conscious effort of others, I think we might call
these combinations ‘creative’. The combinations are not mental, but
bodily and substantive.

Relationships within and beyond the palem are not contingent to the
person, their identity or their bodily substance. They are that body, iden-
tity and person. The distinctions noted in the prevalent Euro-American
mode of creativity, between mind and matter, reproduction and mental
creation, are not present in the mode of Reite people making new palem.
They are ‘creations’ because they bring into being a microcosm of the
social cosmos, a single entity which embodies in its own constitution, the
power of its relational make-up. Thus generativity is willed by persons
and that will is embodied by the novel outcomes of their combinatorial
acts. It remains with the products. Thus people as creations of other per-
sons, not nature or biology, are able to create other bodies.

Palem first came into being through the actions of beings Nekgini
speakers know as patuki. Pomo patuki is a particular narrative of the actions
of certain patuki, which tells of the transition from a primordial state with-
out gender, marriage or exchange, to existence as it is currently experi-
enced. The characters (patuki) presided over the first palem formation in a
place called Pomo, and the first exchange relations. Their actions caused
the emergence of reproductive species in the environment, and differ-
ences between the character, material culture, and geography of people
and places. All this followed from an initial act of differentiation. A
‘mother’ or ‘sister’ had a vagina/design tattooed between her legs. This act
precipitated anger and fighting between the other characters of the myth
(a pair of siblings), and in the subsequent movements of their fight, chase,
and eventual reconciliation through exchange (from different positions in
the emergent landscape), human existence came into being (Leach 2003).

On the evidence I have presented this is a large claim to make. How-
ever, it is not my claim, but that of Nekgini speakers. All they now know
and experience followed from the initial gendering, fight and separation.
Pomo Patuki is pablik (public), a patuki belonging to everyone.

Pomo patuki is the condition of human existence. The term patuki cov-
ers not only the narrative and characters in what anthropologists call
‘myth’. It also designates knowledge itself, and the power of knowledge
to have effect as the magical names of these powerful beings. The appear-
ance of patuki is in the physical forms of the landscape, of different
exchange items produced in various places, and most fundamentally in
the gendering of bodies. All this is to say that ‘myth’ (knowledge) itself is
not thought of by these people as intellectual as opposed to physical. Dif-
fferences are between kinds of people with different control over knowl-
dge, not between intellectual and other forms of activity. Narrative,
character and power are in the form of persons, and are distributed, pab-
lik, through and in the persons who embody this power. Pomo patuki is
not abstract knowledge but is the existential condition which persons
exhibit in their distinct gendered forms, belonging to and constructing
palem.
Now if Nekgini speakers see *Pomo patuki* as the practice which is generative of their particular social form then they assume that this is how people must *be* as humans. Each marriage is an instantiation of that *patuki*. Reproduction, then, as the initial condition of human emergence, is always present in the form and generation of persons as *palem* members. Social life does not have a structure independent of the creative power of *patuki* (people’s action).

Creativity, in terms of combination and in terms of generating other persons (novelty) is thus intrinsic, necessary to this personhood. It is also why one can sensibly think of creativity as distributed, and why the myth of *Pomo*, distributed (‘public’) knowledge of the condition of human life, is cited as the human condition. Such narratives do not outline possibilities, they outline a necessity – that is, the necessity of keeping the human world in existence (Mimica 1991), a necessity in no dependable (mechanical) sense. The emphasis on establishing creativity in Euro-America is not the same as this necessity. The Euro-American myth is one of competitive creativity. It is based on the notion of appropriation (property). The Nekgini necessity requires further action to be taken to keep the world in human form. This is not a constant search for novel acts of appropriation.

**Rai Coast Agency**

In what form does will or agency, another aspect of our working definition of creativity, appear? An ethnographic example illustrates how the distribution of creativity is also the distribution of will or agency. Early in 1999, a young woman from the hamlet of Sarangama made a payment to some of her kinsmen within the hamlet. There was some controversy and ill feeling about the payment as it was *requested* by those kinsmen. Requesting payment for anything in this region is seen as shameful. In both the general principle, and in the particular instance I outline, knowing one’s obligations (Crook 2001a) is seen as a mark of an adult person. Obligations are intrinsic to the definition of personhood, not just morality. Asking for something implies the other does not know how to behave.

In essence, the case refers to a girl (Yatat) who was connected to two groups of people (Sarangama and Kumundung). She had kin in each group, and had been nurtured on both their lands when her father became too ill to bring her up. Prior to her marriage, it was seen as necessary to define the interests each group had in her. Senior Sarangama men made plain their wish that Yatat should make them a presentation of wealth, payment for their nurture, before she left them in marriage.

The example illustrates two points. Firstly, that persons are explicitly viewed as combinations of the work and input of other people. There was no question that Sarangama were entitled to a share of Yatat’s bride-payments whatever their previous connection. They had worked to grow her. Secondly, that moral personhood is the knowledge of these connections appearing as the transaction of wealth items.
This notion of ‘work’ is foreign to the Euro-American mode of creativity I have outlined. As we have seen, physical conception is not a ‘a work’ (Ingold 1986: 180). Rather, creativity is recognised when it involves input from outside physical matter, the imprint of reason or purpose. The Euro-American idea that evolution or nature can go on without will and effort confirms these things as elements of human existence, and therefore contingent ‘in the world’. Only what persons themselves produce, the change or development that they partake in, are seen as ‘works’.

Nekgini speakers class actions which have effects in the bodies and minds of other people as ‘work’. For example, horticulture involves the manipulation and coercion of spirit bodies and cooperation from wives; a gardener also needs knowledge derived from his maternal kin to be successful. Garden produce is the outcome of one agent acting upon others, and thus involves ‘work’ in this sense. A man organising a payment solicits advice, guidance and magical assistance from his elders. Those who receive the payment are described as the origin or reason for the work. Without the cooperation of widely distributed kin, the event will never take place. Spirits are essential to the process, constructing the palem structure and drawing the receivers to the exchange. Though the work of organising may be attributed to one person, or husband/wife pair, it is explicit that many work and receive recognition for it.

Obligations are substituted in exchanges, as we see with Yatat, where obligations incurred through receiving nurture are substituted for obligations incurred through the receipt of ‘help’. The named recipient or donor does not undertake such work as an option. That one person is seen as a combination themselves, of the input, the will, knowledge and agency of others; both receivers and supporters. The obligation that Yatat feels, that her brothers feel, in making a payment to her mother’s brothers (MBs) is a moral duty already in place within her bodily constitution. Others’ work in producing that placed and connected body is thus made visible. As the work of others, Yatat and her brothers are already constituted in the will and agency of others. It was those others’ intention to grow her body through their actions. Nekgini speakers do not imagine the body growing automatically without specific kinds of action on the part of kinsmen. Thus Yatat and her siblings are themselves the creations of those particular relationships.

Now if this payment is an acknowledgement of the common moral duty of all persons to recognise the ‘work’ inputs of others, this implies that persons are made up of the will of others. The will/intention of others is manifest in them, not as a contingent addition (I am this person, now I am being forced to do something by someone else), but as a necessary constitutive factor of their being (being this person, I am obligated to others).

What then is the person on the Rai Coast? They are the ‘works’ of other people, and thus they are what we might call the ‘instruments’ for those others’ will and personhood to expand through relationships. Or rather, they are both instrument and relationship because these things come together in any person. The mode in which will, agency and work
appear as persons does not allow their abstraction as the person is the combination of these aspects of other persons.

Now speaking broadly for Euro-Americans, a person’s body originated in their father and mother’s bodies, but not in their creativity. Intent and will are encompassed by instinct, and control over the outcome does not exist as control over an object, but an entity with developing subjectivity in its own right. In this construction, a child ‘belongs’ to its parents, but not as an object. Appropriative creativity is a mode in which objects are realised and controlled. This is not strictly true when children come into being. A different mode of creativity is in evidence, which is problematic for property. Thus as Strathern (n.d.) has recently written, ‘the arena of family and kin relations is exactly where the Euro-American arithmetic that creates objects in the world falters’.

Mental and Material

How then do items which are created and held in the mind, recombined and presented as novel, figure in the characterisation of Nekgini speakers that I am drawing? Surely the fact that these people have a spirit cult, that they design and carve decorations to accompany the appearance of the spirits, that such things are owned and transacted, disproves my assertion that the same distinction between the mental and the material is not made here?

During the 1970s, a particularly prominent elder man revealed two new spirit voices. New spirits are described as appearing in the heads and thoughts of a particular person. Ancestors or patuki gave the person the thought, and it was ‘because they wanted to give a child to’ another spirit. Authorship lies beyond the person, yet not in a realm of transcendence, but in the work of others. New spirits are born, the children of other spirits. Emphasis is placed not on the intellectual aspect of the creation (a single mind labouring), but on the reproductive potential of the thing itself. The ‘work’ involved in revealing the spirit voice turns out to be the same work that is required for having effects in the minds and actions of others. The dreamer feeds both spirits and people with cooked pork. It is this that establishes the spirit voice as his, and it is this work that is cited as the reason that others may not appropriate the spirit.

There are other aspects to a performance of spirit voices (Leach 1999). Long wooden poles are carved in secret by men of the cult. These poles (tarr) are carried by a single man during the dancing. They stand vertically in a frame upon the man’s shoulders, and thus reach high into the air. They carry shapes of snakes and lizards, and have designs associated with the spirits of the palem group (who are dancing) carved upon them. Torr are kept hidden until the night of the performance, and are revealed only briefly by the light of flaming fire-brands, which are readied for the purpose.
A recent innovation in the carved designs displayed to accompany spirit voice renditions was shown in 1999. It came into being when an elder saw a snake twined around a tree in the sacred grove of a particular spirit. When he cooked pigs for a life cycle payment, he unveiled this new design. Yet such an originator has no right to dispose of this design. In the same way as a new tambaran song has a single creator, yet is owned multiply by the residential group that its creator belongs to, so a design is multiply owned by a residential group.

The forms of torr posts must not be copied exactly. Reproducing the same combination of images and figures would be seen as shameful by the owners, and as inappropriate copying, by others. Each element that goes to make up a torr (particular snakes or lizards, particular designs) are owned by palem groups. These elements are held in the memories of men from these groups, and combined in new forms for each occasion.32

Interestingly, appropriation of spirit voices, designs, or even patuki are offences which incur fines among Nekgini speakers. In essence, making payments in the currency of kin transactions (the charge for the theft of a spirit voice is to cook pigs and distribute them to the owners) establishes the inclusion of the wrong-doer in the kin group of those he has wronged. If spirits and persons are substitutable, if they constitute one another’s existence and identity, then ‘theft’ is not really the right gloss for appropriation. Claims of inclusion might be a better explanation for what has happened when a spirit is used without authority (Leach 2000a). The consequence is a call by those who do have authority for the person to establish his connection to them. This can be done in retrospect through ‘work’, though making presentations which do include him within the relationships which have as one of their nodes, particular spirits, songs or designs. These items are not primarily mental abstractions, but elements in the relational constitution of particular persons. ‘[T]he Melanesian “right” to reproduce [an image/design/song] is sustained not by a legal apparatus but by the person being in the appropriate and necessary ontological state to exercise the right … the very exercise of the right is an instantiation of the substance of the right itself. Making “duplicates” is (to reproduce) the capacity for creation’ (Strathern n.d.: 22).

The authors of new spirit voices are party to, or facilitators of, the reproductive potential embodied in the image / song / artefact itself. Thus the significant point about such things is not their status as things in the mind, but their analogy with and positioning within, the reproductive capacity of relationships between persons. A spirit can reproduce itself. It is not a mental addition or creation in the thought processes of the person who dreams the thing.

Memories of torr posts allow carvers to make new ones. There is a novel combination of elements, which to Euro-Americans looks remarkably like the operation of intellectual creativity. And the restrictions on others copying the images seems to confirm this (in the model of copyright). But, as I pointed out, it is not the novel combination (as a mental appropriation from a common pool) but the elements themselves which are ‘protected’.
Indeed the authors may not copy the combination of images from any previous post of their own creation. This then is nothing like copyright, where the original idea is instantiated in material composition, and then the rights to copy that composition are attached to the originator of the idea. Here no one can copy the specific forms (i.e., combinations) of torr posts. The images which are combined are kept separately available for new creative projects. It is not then a particular instantiation and material realisation of ideas that is valued, but the elements, which are valued as instruments for future action. People do own images, ideas, but these are not owned in objects. In other words, they do not rely on the separation of mental/ideational creativity from its instantiation in an object which can then be owned as property. The same goes for people themselves. They too have reproductive potential because of their constitution in the work of others. They can be owned and transacted, but not as property, rather as instruments of others’ past and future projects.

Conclusion

My argument has been that a Euro-American mode of creativity in the realm of knowledge making, as it is apparent in policy statements to encourage the phenomenon, and in legislation designed to protect intellectual property, assumes it is contingent to social life. This is ‘contingent’ in the sense it is used in logic: neither logically necessary, nor logically impossible. I argued that this contingency is related to a particular construction of the person found in such statements, and more generally. For contemporary Euro-Americans, it seems, human creativity is first and foremost constituted as an intellectual phenomenon. When instantiated, it may have the effect of altering an already-structured environment, or producing new objects. But creativity itself is already absent from structures and objects. It exists within the mind/person. The creative process, exemplified in occasional and significant interventions, is abstracted from the everyday and from ‘the world’. This conceptual sequence makes for the high valuation placed upon creativity as a description of a kind of action.

Among Nekgini speakers emphasis is placed on achieving the correct form of relationships to other people. This form contains creative force. If Euro-Americans separate that which gives purpose (the mind/will) from the physicality of the body then their physical bodies are entities devoid of creativity, even though they change and develop. In contrast, Nekgini speakers see subjectivity distributed in objects. This allows for a conception of a distributed creativity, an animated landscape composed of different kinds of bodies in which change and effect are events with meaning on the same level as human actions. Will and control of the object world are not defining factors of personhood against the physical. Rather, particular positioning within a network of subjective positions on which the person can have an effect (through work) is both the substance and the
realisation of personhood. Nekgini weather magicians see their own actions manifest in the change of weather patterns. Like illness, all weather is caused by *someone*. That is, in an intersubjectively constituted landscape, all effects are caused by the actions of other subjects.

One way to express this would be to say that intersubjectivity is not contingent but necessary to the particular being, substance, body and effect of each person. Subjects are different from one another because the ‘necessity’ of their being *is* their specific position in relation to other agents/persons. This all has consequences for how and what people own. The Euro-American conceptualisations of the intellect we have been considering position it outside the ongoing processes of physical regeneration. In the domain of knowledge making, creativity is contingent. It can be encouraged or discouraged, stifled or suppressed. The ability to ‘think creatively’ is not necessary to human being itself. Rather the correct control over objects in the material world through the use of the intellect is. Symbolic or mental work of innovative combination is viewed as input into an artefact. The object comes to have abstract attributes of its own (covered in patent legislation by recognition of the object’s ‘novelty’, or as an embodiment of an ‘inventive step’), which thus are abstracted from the person who produced it. Creative work is solidified and abstracted. It is no longer available for use, but must be recaptured in manipulating the conditions under which thinking can manage directed and intentional combinations again. This conceptualisation re-embeds creativity in the person just as its effects are made apparent in external physical objects.

Rai Coast people have it a different way around. They do appropriate from nature, produce objects, and own them, but they understand this as the creation of persons. Thus the models of ownership which Rai Coast dwellers operate most of the time are not models based on an appropriative creativity, but on a distributed creativity. Why make this contrast? Is it just another version of a projected absolute difference between Melanesia and Euro-America? Absolutely not, as the two modes here identified exist already within Euro-American thinking.33

For Reite people creativity is a necessary process. Human life does not continue without it. Humanity is not defined by the contingency of creative action (in thought/mental operation) but by the necessity of embodying and acting creatively. Relations established with others create those others and oneself in the work of differentiation. We come to this insight through the contrast with intellectual property rights, which make creativity into a specific resource, its presence contingent upon certain conditions of emergence. The notion of resource implies scarcity, and scarcity is a measure of value. But creativity is not scarce in Reite. Resources for these people lie elsewhere. People themselves are valuable, not what they produce as objects. As Wagner points out, ‘Westerners’ value the objects, the outcomes of creativity: ‘we keep the ideas, the quotations, the memoirs, the creations and let the people go. Our attics ... [and] museums are full of this kind of culture’ (Wagner 1975: 26). In contrast, *palems* do not last. *Torr* posts rot away in the bush. Their effect is to
maintain separations between people, to distribute ‘creativity’ throughout existence. IPR has the effect, to the contrary, of concentrating creativity in particular individuals, and then in individual kinds of mental operation which amount to forms of appropriation by the subject.

To close, I note as a finding of this exploration that the way that production and consumption is handled by Chris Gregory, utilising Marx (1982: 30–32 and passim), has parallels with the two modes of creativity that I have outlined. Appropriative creativity is what I describe for Europe or America, and includes an anthropological approach. The critique or alternative mode that I have outlined comes from Melanesia, but it could equally easily come from Euro-America itself. This is because each mode contains the seed of its alternative. Locke, in his reliance on labour as appropriative, does not consider what reconstitutes labour. But the reconstitution of labour (the production of persons) is exactly what Reite people are interested in. The production of objects is incidental, yet it does occur. As there is a domain outside appropriative creativity within our own understanding, we need not identify a culture or a region with one mode alone. Thus we could perhaps follow Gregory, and label the appropriative mode ‘consumptive production’. Consumptive production as a mode uses up resources, and therefore ‘contains’ questions about how these resources will be replaced and renewed. (In Marx, this becomes the question of how to maintain labour power.)

Creativity for Nekgini speakers is not a mode of individual appropriation. People do not think of asserting rights over ‘inventions’ (business developments) because it is the people they seek to control, not the objects. Palem leaders ‘appropriate’ persons, they incorporate them into their endeavours, but since these endeavours are the production of persons or person-like objects, these creations are already connected to their producers. There is no need for a further appropriation sanctioned in law. But in business, which does not seem to produce persons, the mode of creative endeavour breaks down, people cannot control people (through reciprocal obligation), and the system seems to run out of control. Applying a distributed mode of creativity to business (a Euro-American form of transaction and personhood) results in innovations which are not claimed, while claims over people (from either the entrepreneur or his workers), escalate out of hand.

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paper. Of course, they cannot be held responsible for it in the Euro-American mode of creativity.

Notes

1. The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), for example, reconstituted by the UN in the 1970s, is pursuing its mission to ‘promote the protection of Intellectual Property throughout the world’ as an adjunct to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. Inclusion in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) for nations such as Papua New Guinea has been made conditional upon their adoption of the WIPO-formulated treaty on ‘Trade Related Intellectual Property Protection’ (TRIPPs). Interest comes both from developed nations looking to protect their publishing and music industries, and from developing nations looking to protect local inventions and innovations, and indigenous knowledge.

2. For example, a recent UNESCO document reporting on the ‘UNESCO-WIPO World Forum on the Protection of Folklore’ states: ‘in contrast with the individual, personal nature of the creativity represented by literary and artistic works proper – it [cultural heritage] is the result of impersonal creativity of unknown members of the nation or communities thereof’.

3. Although see Wagner (1975).

4. While I explore different modes of creativity, it is important to understand that I do not promise to replace a universal definition with multiple, alternative definitions. Rather I look to suggest how different modes of creativity may be examined. I relate the results of this examination in two instances to different forms of transaction and personhood.

5. Although see Barron (1998), who argues against the assumption of a romantic sensibility in the development of authorial copyright. If she is right, the question remains as to why that assumption should have been read into IPR in Euro-America.

6. I pursue this through the comparison of an understanding of creativity which is dispersed through media, government and business literature, as well as UNESCO and WIPO policies, and the specificity of creative endeavour in a particular location, the Rai Coast of Papua New Guinea. In the latter case, calling a constellation of elements ‘creativity’ is my gloss on how a mode of action operates, and how it is understood and valued. Thus creativity can ‘appear’ for me in Reite. Armed with the notion of different modes, however, I do not assume that the understandings or operations are similar in their social conditions or consequences. The first question that must be addressed is the basis on which we may compare Euro-America and Melanesia in examining conceptions of creativity. The Rai Coast language with which I am familiar (Nekgini) does not seem to have a word with the same associations as the English ‘creativity’. However, as a concept which is already used in representations of Melanesia, both anthropological and institutional, it seems justifiable to try and work out where creativity fits in IP, and what the comparable processes might look like elsewhere.

8. See Liep (2001). Contributors to Liep’s volume in the main examine the kinds of combinations and innovations in which anthropologists can see the creation of novel forms in culture. Different cultures are an explicit focus, but different modes of creativity are not.

9. The focus on combination is important for my argument as it allows different constellations of elements to be compared as combinations. Some might object in that we would be hard pressed to find something new that was not made up of familiar constituents. In fact human culture itself has been seen as remaking meaning in ever changing situations. This is an aspect of the Euro-American view of culture as a human project. Our being is constituted by our biology, which then transcends itself. We create our own conditions of existence, as Marx says, not from conditions of our choosing. Combination then is an expression of our understanding of creativity. How it operates, however, in different social settings, is what I wish to focus upon here.

10. It may be that we cannot even begin to talk of a specialised domain of knowledge production, thus intellectual property is not appropriate in such places for exactly this reason (Kalinoe n.d.).

11. ‘An education which introduces students to different ways of thinking and different approaches to knowledge is likely to encourage the qualities which will be of lasting importance over a lifetime of employment’ (Council for Science and Technology 2001).

12. These lie in intellectual property regimes. ‘Recent management theory has prompted businesses to redefine their strategic assets including intangibles such as brand and organisational knowledge; to innovate new processes, products and services; and to start finding ways to engage more creatively with customers, employees and partners’ (Kimbell 2002: 6).

13. ‘If competition emanates from the agent’s own sense of agency, a firm’s fear of or readiness for battle, then this internal motivation (competitiveness) is being externalized. To be precise, it is externalized in so far as competition is anticipated, even imagined. The blocking patent can even create competitors in the abstract’ (Strathern 2002: 254, original emphasis).

14. ‘During the 1980’s it [creativity] had become increasingly popular in the media and public discourse. The virtues of creative solutions, creative people and creative attitudes were extolled in judgements of artistic and occupational success or failure, they were celebrated in career profiles and in high demand in recruitment advertisements’ (Löfgren 2001: 71).

15. I do not mean to imply that this difference is the same as that between ‘art’ and business endeavour for Euro-Americans. These innovations/creations are not ‘art’ in the Euro-American sense (see Gell 1998).

16. It is worth the detour via Blake here as he was undeniably ‘creative’ and his creativity relied upon combinations of previous images and ideas (Raine 1962).

17. Although he does not use the word.

18. There is much more that could be said here. Sociobiology as a theory, for example, gives a certain kind of ‘will’ to nature, and thus places creative agency at the level of genes. Without intellect or purpose, however, this is a mechanical expansion rather than creative in the way IP would recognise. There is no identifiable labourer and instigator, thus no owner/property.

19. Something that is also discernible in IP law.
20. The premise that discovery is not creativity is a central tenet of patents. In the difference between what is produced as novel by an agent, and what is produced by random chance, we see something of the logic which maintains a difference between discovery and invention. In the first, an agent seeks things which exist. This is not enough to warrant a patent. Novelty is not the work of an agent. In the second, an agent utilises what has been discovered or revealed in a directed way, and thus makes a novel outcome which has the imprint of the mind as integral to its form. As such, a form of abstract labour is apparent in that form, and can be claimed under IP law.

21. ‘[T]he notion of the ex nihilo is a clear fascination in our world. It harbours the heroic so dear to the intellectual heart or, perhaps, ego. Creativity in the arts has often been represented in such terms’ (Friedman 2001: 46).

22. Darwin, it is reported, acknowledged that he was in a ‘hopeless muddle’ about what started the process of evolution going (Ingold 1986: 175). Where mechanistic connections are distinguished from willed, intellectual leaps of imagination (creativity), one is left with this kind of ‘ontological’ question.

23. Marx’s comment that what distinguishes the worst of architects from the best of bees is that the architect raises the building in his mind ‘before he builds it in wax’ (1930: 170).

24. Reite is the name of the hamlets on the Rai Coast in which I conducted fieldwork.

25. The payment itself in this form is called a ‘palem’, and the co-resident group who generated it are known thereafter as ‘one palem’.

26. This example is a typical one in that it shows how separations are generated and combinations achieved as a matter of course here.

27. Yatat was clearly positioned by this exchange. She had fulfilled obligations to a set of people who were thus separated from her. Those that helped her in this action became ‘closer’ in that they were now the significant ‘siblings’ to whom she would distribute her marriage payments. What was unclear because of Yatat’s unusual position is only made clearer by degree in the case of children who grow up with the support of their father’s siblings (i.e., in his palem). The work, nurture and wealth they are able to give to their MB’s makes a comparable, if more conventional separation between places and kin groups prior to marriage. Sarangama were obviously concerned that the legacy of their work might be overlooked because of the unconventional position (living with cross-cousins) of Yatat prior to marriage.

28. A Lockean conception of the identification of a person and what they own through the series: purpose, work and object.

29. This example takes male action in gardening and exchange as its focus. It would be equally true to say that women’s work in nurturing children, for example, requires recognition. That is, its effect on the bodies and minds of children and fathers is made apparent in exchanges with ‘mothers’ as the recipients (see kalawaung payments in Leach 2003: 129).

30. ‘Work’ in the Nekgini context is always described as things people do in aid of growing other people, and the corollary, making ceremonial payments to affines. In the sense that both have an effect on others, and register in their future actions, work is the way that relationships are made (cf. Marx for whom production [work] was co-operative).

31. Torr are only ever used once, and are taken back to the spirit abodes in which they were carved, to rot after their single use.
32. Strathern has written ‘the ornaments and songs and habits of comportment which these PNG people produce are not “representations”. They are more like demonstrations or certifications’ (Strathern n.d.: 12). Images such as the elements that are combined in torr posts are not particularly ‘intellectual’, she argues. The fact that they appear in the heads or thoughts of carvers or dreamers does not make them different from the physical instances of those images.

33. The very processes that Euro-Americans focus upon most neatly exclude the focus of action we see on the Rai Coast because these are explicitly about the reproduction of persons. Rai Coast people see other people as what they ‘create’, and the way they do this, how they conceptualise what they see of themselves in other people, is thus comparable on an analytic level to more familiar notions of authorship. In fact, such a juxtaposition highlights many assumptions about the person-as-author. The framing interest in creativity makes the connections people see between themselves and the things or objects that they help produce, commensurable. It suggests that we need not become embroiled in positioning objects, persons and things within ‘regimes of value’ (Appadurai 1986) which themselves become abstract objects of attention and description. Rather we examine how different regimes of value may be generated by the very interest people have in their creations. Comparison may occur on the grounds of a common focus which transcends distinctions in what is produced (persons, things, rituals and so forth) and distinctions between kinds of producers (indigenous, technological, capitalist, subsistence, artistic) as a priori definitions.